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Luxembourg is the EU and OECD member state (MS) with a permanently increasing immigra-
tion and the highest share of immigrants and cross border commuters within the labour force and 
more so within the competitive sector.  
Luxembourg has a typical Bismarckian corporatist welfare system, which has developed a gener-
ous and broad welfare regime over the last 100 years with a further important push during the last 
two decades. Since then, benefits offered muted steadily to middle class standards and providers 
were merged to universalistic national bodies, leaving behind the different former corporatist 
providers. Due to a higher dependency on welfare benefits due to the economic downturn, nearly 
all MS modified from the 1970s onwards their original systems, mostly in the sense of a liberali-
zation with cutbacks in comparison to the former more generous provisions. There has been a 
shift in responsibility from the state to the individual citizen via different means such as a non-
increase of benefits, restricting eligibility (re-commodification), restructuring schemes in a radi-
cal way (recalibration) and cost containment measures (Pierson, 2001). Luxembourg however 
expanded and improved its system. 
What is the link between immigration and the outstanding evolution of the welfare system?  
The steady increase of young foreign contributors (immigrants and crossers) provided Luxem-
bourg with the means to develop from a corporatist model to a Scandinavian with highest provi-
sions, an emerging service sector and no significant retrenchment policy. Immigrants contribute, 
on average, more to the different welfare insurances than they use them, given their on average 
younger age, given a predominantly economic immigration and given higher employment rates 
than those of nationals. 
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1  Introduction 
Luxembourg is the EU and OECD member state (MS) with the highest share of im-
migrants within the resident population, within the labour force and more so within 
the competitive sector. It has a long standing tradition with immigrants, since the end 
of 19th century. It implemented a clear immigration policy aiming at the arrival of 
Europeans. Furthermore, it developed since then a policy attracting the same time 
highly qualified immigrants and foreign economic decision makers from the North-
ern hemisphere as well as poorly qualified manual workers from Southern regions of 
Europe (Italy, Portugal and the former Republic of Yugoslavia; Hartmann-Hirsch, 
2010).  
This particular situation produced a unique stratification, positioning on top of 
the societal pyramid a transnational economic elite (Hartmann-Hirsch and Amétépé, 
2010), which runs a booming economy – a „virtual spiral‟ (Schuller, 2002) – putting 
Luxembourg on top of GDP and employment growth scales1. The wealth produced 
in this small MS is, in an outstanding way, due to the leading highly qualified trans-
national elites, a very active, thus efficient group of less qualified immigrants and a 
quantitatively more important group of cross border commuters; nationals became 
minority in the domestic labour force and more so in the competitive sector.  
Luxembourg has a typical Bismarckian corporatist welfare system, which has 
developed a generous and broad welfare regime over the last 100 years with a further 
important push during the last two decades. Since then, benefits offered muted stea-
dily to middle class standards and providers were merged to universalistic national 
bodies, leaving behind the different former corporatist providers. Beside the gener-
ous transfers, Luxembourg also developed considerably the service sector, going thus 
more and more in the sense of Scandinavian regimes. Due to a higher dependency on 
welfare benefits due to the economic downturn, nearly all MS modified from the 
1970s onwards their original systems, mostly in the sense of a liberalization with 
cutbacks in comparison to the former more generous provisions. There has been a 
shift in responsibility from the state to the individual citizen via different means such 
as a non-increase of benefits, restricting eligibility (re-commodification), restructur-
                                                       
1 OECD reports, JER, JRSPI of the CEC, 2 
 
ing schemes in a radical way (recalibration) and cost containment measures (Pierson, 
2001). Luxembourg however expanded and improved its system. What happened in 
Luxembourg? Its evolution is in contradiction with the aforementioned general trend 
of other corporatist or Scandinavian models. What is the link between immigration 
and the outstanding evolution of the welfare system?  
Initially, welfare systems were developed within Nation-states, aiming – in a 
somehow „natural‟ way - at nationals. Immigrants were considered as not belonging 
to the nation-State‟s system. After WW II, national welfare states became obliged by 
supranational conventions to open-up and integrate all2 residents, to avoid exclusion 
of certain groups and provide all3 residents with equal opportunities (Bommes, 2007, 
Ette, Faist, 2007). However, even within supranational (EU) legal texts, immigrants 
are considered to be a potential „burden‟ on the social security budgets; this has ob-
viously patterned some of the exclusion conditions within national law (section 3.2.). 
Integration in  the area of social  security is  done via attributing social  rights,  the 
equivalent amount of public spending and access to social services. Immigrants are 
entitled to certain/to all benefits, according to the type of welfare regime in the dif-
ferent EU member states (MS) and their migration status (EU or non-EU; Sainsbury, 
2006).  Integration policies of nation-states vary with regard to the opening-up of 
immigrants.  
How do nation-states cope with their national mission as opposed to their suprana-
tional obligations? What about the opening up of welfare schemes to immigrants, about the 
incorporation Nation-States foresee for those „externals‟?  
In the following sections we will, in a first stage, present some key features of Lux-
embourg‟s immigration and its welfare regime. We will also provide a concrete example of 
the opening-up of social rights to immigrants, demonstrating Luxembourg‟s incorporation 
policy. In a second stage, we will analyse the contributions to taxes and social security as 
well as consumptions of benefits and insurances by EU and non-EU immigrants and nation-
als – both highly or less qualified. This will enable us to provide a preliminary answer to our 
main question: How was it possible that Luxembourg could avoid retrenchment policies for 
                                                       
2 Including immigrants, but depending on the supranational level, this « universal membership model » might be 
defined by EU institutions, thus providing EU citizens with access, or by other supranational institutions, such 
as the European Council including hence more than the EU – 27, or even by worldwide institutions like UN.
2 A 
more detailed and general classification is presented in Hartmann-Hirsch (2009). 
3 We skip the stronger conditions for non-EU citizens, who – with regard to EU legislation - obtain a residence permit 
only if the contract provides with at least the minimum wage. 3 
 
its corporatist-universalistic system? Our answer will be that a booming economy run, to an 
extent of two thirds, by foreigners (migrants and cross border commuters) allowed this ex-
ceptional evolution of the welfare model of this small nation-state.  
2  A performing Immigration 
2.1  A Long Standing Tradition of Immigration 
Luxembourg is the second smallest member of the EU with 502 066 inhabitants in 
2010, of which 43 percent are foreigners. With regard to two categories, Luxem-
bourg  implemented  a  pro-active  immigration  policy:  First,  Luxembourg  always 
aimed at a European immigration, having signed two conventions with Portugal and 
the former Republic of Yugoslavia in 1970 – and not signing a prepared labour ex-
change convention with Tunisia! Before this, during the first half of 20
th century, 
Italian manual workers immigrated to work in the steel industry and reached nearly 
20 percent of the resident population in 1930. From the 1970‟s onwards, low skilled 
non-EEC Portuguese and to a lesser extent Yugoslavs had then an eased access to the 
labour market. Secondly, most OECD countries developed recently an immigration 
policy aimed, in a privileged way, at highly qualified immigrants. Luxembourg did 
so since long time: Prussian engineers launched the steel industry at the end of the 
19
th century and again foreign managers came to Luxembourg in order to develop the 
financial sector after the steel crisis in the 1970s (von Kunitzki, 2007).  
 
Luxembourg is positioned on top of the OECD scale with regard to the share of 
„highly qualified amongst all recently (last ten years) arrived immigrants‟ and with 
regard to the share of „immigrants being in high skill jobs‟
4. The group of highly 
skilled immigrants became more numerous than the national equivalent (table 1) and 
it is better qualified than the equivalent group of nationals. The countries of origin 
are mainly those from the Northern hemisphere (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008). Almost 
three quarters (72 percent) of the highest 5 percent of wages and 79 percent of direc-
tors of the banking sector are foreigners (Fehlen and Pigeron-Piroth, 2009).This poli-
cy has been implemented, in the case of Luxembourg, by easing the access to the la-
                                                       
4 OECD, 2009: 14 s. All those who have a BA or a BSc are considered as highly qualified. We applied the same defi-
nition for our analysis. 4 
 
bour market for non-EU citizens with high wages without a modification of the legal 
framework (OECD, 2003: 110). Similar to the German „Zuwanderungsgesetz‟, the 
Parliament adopted a new immigration law in 2008 differentiating immigrants ac-
cording to a selective immigration policy (high wages, university degrees etc.), the-
reby legalizing the previously implicit policy. Nationals appear to be in a sandwich 
situation, being positioned in between the two aforementioned two groups
5. In addi-
tion, the share of international officials is one of the highest in the EU. Since the 
1950‟s, Luxembourg hosted a number of international organisations, and internation-
al officials currently present 4,3 percent of the domestic labour market and 5 percent 
of the resident population
6. 
 
Luxembourg is the country with the lowest share of Third Country Nationals 
(Thill-Ditsch, 2010). Their share remained low and stable with 5 percent in 2000 in-
creasing to 6 percent in 2009 (resident population). Only 3.8 percent of the resident 
population are less qualified non-EU citizens (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Proportions of economically active nationals and immigrants as a share of all economically 
active persons aged 25 to 64 by level of education 
 
Luxembourgian and immigrant groups   2002  2006  
Highly qualified Luxembourgians (HQ)  9.5  9.8 
HQ immigrants: EU/non-EU  10.6  13.0 
Less qualified Luxembourgians (LQ)  48.2  44.5 
LQ EU immigrants
7  27.9  28.9 
LQ non-EU immigrants  3.7  3.8 
Total  100.0  100.0 
Source: PSELL3/EU-SILC, waves 2002 and 2006, authors‟ calculations. The cut-off for defining the level of education is 
BAC+3. This is based on the OECD definition. 
 
   
                                                       
5 Cf Fehlen and Pigeron-Piroth, 2009: 79 percent of directors of the financial sector are foreigners. 
6 Cf. http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/statec/index.html, 2008 
7 A differentiation is made between EU and non-EU only for less qualified immigrants, as the latter have been subject 
to more rigorous conditions since the establishment of the selective policies (1990s/2000s).   5 
 
2.2  Immigration and Employment Growth 
Three elements compose the domestic labour force; nationals (29 percent), immi-
grants (27 percent) and cross border commuters (44 percent) (IGSS, 2009). In com-
parison with the EU, Luxembourg was mostly on top of the scale with regard to GDP 
and employment increase
8 with an average annual growth of 3.7 percent between 
1998 and 2008; for cross border commuters, the annual average was 8.8 percent, for 
resident migrants 3.7 percent and for nationals 0.3 percent (Di Bartolomeo, 2 009). 
Thus, Luxembourg‟s economy and labour market heavily depended, and depend on 
foreigners (immigrants and cross border commuters). 68 percent of the domestic la-
bour market and 74 percent of the competitive sector are foreigners; 44 percent of 
them are immigrants and 56 percent are cross border commuters (Statec, 2008). 
The increase of cross border commuters was always higher than that of immi-
grants and more so than that of nationals. However, we observe an even higher in-
crease for Third Country Nationals and more so for new MS. The share of non-EU 
citizens remains between 2 and 3 percent of the domestic labour market given the 
aforementioned European immigration policy: after each EU enlargement, numerous 
European former non-EU immigrants were shifted to the group of EU-citizens, re-
ducing each time the meanwhile increased group of Third-Country-Nationals.  
Furthermore, Luxembourg‟s immigration is predominantly economic; it figures 
on top of the OECD scale with 54.3 percent as compared to an average of 14.5 per-
cent (OECD, 2009: 16); thus, the share of family reunion and humanitarian inflows is 
low as compared to the OECD average. The latter two are considered being more in 
danger of poverty and exclusion, being eventually a „burden‟ to welfare schemes. 
Furthermore, Luxembourg never ordered a stop to an economic immigration. Since 
WW II, there is an uninterrupted inflow of migrants - and more so of cross border 
commuters
9 - with a steady increase of the highly qualified immigrants and economic 
decision makers.  
In conclusion, we observe a well performing immigration (and cross border mov e-
ment): First, the proportion of less qualified Third -Country-Nationals has decreased, 
which might partly be due to recent selective policies (table 1; Hartmann -Hirsch, 2010).  
                                                       
8 cf. Joint Employment Reports (JER) and Joint Reports on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (JRSPSI, 2009. 
9 Due to panel data which do not include cross border commuters we will neglect this even more important share of 
contributors to insurances and taxes. 6 
 
OECD observes  the design of selective immigration policies within most  of its  MS; 
however, only three countries succeeded:  Austria, Luxembourg and Norway (OECD, 
2009: 15
10). Second, overqualification
11 of EU and non-EU citizens is marginal, if not 
inexistent, in contrast to the neighbouring countries (OECD, 2009: 13). The transnational 
brain is obviously vital to the „national‟ economy. And last but not least, transnational 
elites positioned themselves on top of the national elites, producing thus quite unusual 
patterns of „integration and assimilation‟ (Hartmann-Hirsch and Amétépé, 2010). Fo-
reigners are the main contributors to the economic performance of this small nation-state. 
The economy, the labour market, and the society are the most transnationalised within 
the OECD. 
 
3  Luxembourg’s  Welfare  Regime  and  its  incorporation  of  
migrants 
Luxembourg was able to develop, enlarge and improve its welfare system, creating 
one of, if not the most generous regime in the EU. During the last two decades, au-
thorities introduced a comprehensive new care insurance (1998) plus several new 
benefit schemes
12 and launched an important social service sector for children and 
the elderly. On top of these new measures, standards have been considerably i m-
proved (Kieffer, 2008; Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009 and 2010).  
Within this context and in view of the large share and well performing imm i-
grants, it is interesting to see which type of welfare model this small nation-state has 
developed. We will classify Luxembourg‟s welfare protection
13 on the basis of Esp-
ing-Andersen‟s (1990) three welfare models and of Soysal‟s (1994) incorporation 
models and we will present an example of incorporation policies. 
   
                                                       
10 Outcomes are those quoted above. However, we do not control for the link between policies and these outcomes. 
Hartmann-Hirsch (2010) demonstrated the more market than policy driven in- and outflows. 
11 Active persons with a tertiary education (ISCED 5/6) who work in other   - “lower” – than professional or associate 
professional occupations (ISCO 2/3).  
12 Parental leave in 1998, two provisions for the elderly in 1998, etc. 
13 A more detailed and general classification is presented in Hartmann-Hirsch (2009). 
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3.1  A  Corporatist  universalistic  Welfare  Regime  with  Limited  
Efficiency 
Within  the  three  models  (corporatist,  Scandinavian  and  liberal:  Esping-Andersen, 
1990), Luxembourg‟s social protection should be considered as a profoundly corpo-
ratist model: Luxembourg started to adopt Bismarck‟s insurance models by 1901 
with  egalitarian  contributions  by  employers  and  employees  plus  important  co-
financing by the State - with the exception of the care insurance, which is only fi-
nanced by the employees and the State (launched in 1999). Services were underdeve-
loped (Esping-Andersen, 1999). A low female employment rate demonstrated the 
„conservative‟ role leaving child care responsibilities to the family.  Labour market 
participation in these countries is lower than in liberal and Scandinavian systems
14. 
For contributory Bismarckian insurances, which are linked to the work contract, 
immigrants, whether EU or not, are immediately insured (health, pension-disability, 
care and accident insurances). For non-contributory, means tested benefits like social 
assistance, two elements are taken into account: the income and the composition of 
the household – as opposed to the income of the individual person, the Scandinavian 
parameter. The State is the main protecting actor and citizens rely in an easier way 
on public benefits. As a response to the higher take-up, a typical feature of corporat-
ist systems is the fear of abuse of benefits, and more so the fear of abuse by „outsid-
ers‟ (immigrants) as opposed to open Scandinavian schemes, which are built-up on 
the presumption of a „universal solidarity attitude‟ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 100).  
During the last decades, Luxembourg progressively adopted Scandinavian stan-
dards, going even beyond the high Northern European middle class standards in con-
trast to the corporatist and liberal levels with „equity amongst the poor‟ (Esping-
Andersen, 1990).  
Child benefits in Luxembourg are by far the highest in EU. The policies for the 
elderly  are  extremely  generous:  care  insurance  provides  with  the  most  generous 
monthly  cash  benefit  plus  important  benefits  in  kind  (Hartmann-Hirsch,  2007). 
Pension insurance provides with very generous replacement rates (4
th position within 
                                                       
14 Cf Blossfeld et al. 2006 for early exit versus late exit patterns. 8 
 
OECD countries: OECD, 2007). Out-of-pocket money for health provisions by pa-
tients is the lowest within OECD (2008: 123)
15  
Other principles can also be considered as Scandinavian: welfare in Luxembourg is 
highly budgetised
16: some benefits are financed on the basis of the state‟s budget alone (child 
and unemployment benefits: MISSOC). Furthermore, Luxembourg developed an important 
service sector for child care and the elderly leaving thus behind the transfer orientated corpo-
ratist model – a significant recalibration (Pierson, 2001 and Hartmann-Hirsch, forthcoming). 
In addition to that the former corporatist providers/schemes have been merged into one ma-
jor „national‟ insurance
17 - this is the case of health and pension insurances  - or one unique 
national scheme -  this is the case of the care insurance, which has immediately (in 1999) 
been launched as a unique national scheme, including also civil servants. 
Two elements might be considered as liberal ones:  
Contribution rates for employers and employees are the lowest within neighbouring MS 
(Hartmann-Hirsch, forthcoming, table 4), being an incentive to companies to settle in Lux-
embourg. Luxembourg can afford these low indirect labour costs due to high tax incomes - 
the effect of an excellent economic performance with its „virtuous spiral‟ (Schuller, 2002). 
The state compensates the low contribution rates by co-financing these systems generously.  
The care insurance (law of 1998) is financed by the employees/independent or self em-
ployed (plus the state). This is in line with a liberal philosophy, wishing not to hamper the 
competitiveness of the market. Again as opposed to liberal models, the state compensates the 
missing part of the employers. 
Concluding we would say, there is no liberal trend - like in Germany - by introducing 
competition amongst providers by multiplying them, but a clear option for universalistic 
structures in order to provide egalitarian access. Luxembourg expanded its offer, based on a 
steady increase of contributors with a permanent arrival of young immigrants and cross bor-
der  commuters  (Hartmann-Hirsch  forthcoming).  Due  to  these  performing  and  sustaining 
immigrants and cross border commuters, Luxembourg was able to move from a Bismarckian 
system to a more and more Scandinavian one (Hartmann-Hirsch, forthcoming).  
                                                       
15 Cf for more detailed argumentation, cf. Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009 and 2010: forthcoming. 
16 “The tax share of the total financing of social security in Luxembourg is 40% higher than that of its direct 
neighbours that have similar systems of financing (also Bismarckian)“ (Cichon, 2007: 38). 
17 plus  remaining providers for civil servants. 9 
 
With regard to efficiency/sustainability and equity
18, we can assess equity for Luxem-
bourg with comfortable middle class standards but limited efficiency: Two weaknesses have 
been underlined by the CEC and OECD repeatedly: „corporatist‟ early exit patterns and low 
female employment rates
19. Luxembourg did not reach the objectives of the European E m-
ployment Strategy in 2010 with an overall employment rate  of 70 percent, an employment 
rate of 60 percent for women, and 50 percent for workers aged 55  – 64. In 2007, womens‟ 
and the elderly workers‟ employment rates respectively reached 56 and 32 percent (Haag, 
2010). Luxembourg provides numerous incentives for early exit via high replacement rates 
for disability, pension and early retirement schemes as well as via specific corporatist bene-
fits (Hartmann-Hirsch, 2006). The two weaknesses concern more nationals than foreigners 
(Plan National de Réforme, 2008: 44).  
Generally speaking, attitudes of nationals seem to be more influenced by a corporatist 
philosophy, considering the State as the main responsible actor, whilst immigrants seem to 
be more driven by employment orientated Scandinavian or liberal attitudes. 
In terms of Sapir‟s benchmarking, Luxembourg could be – together with Scandinavian 
models - another best practice with equity due to the improving broad and generous welfare 
offer. However, sustainability/efficiency is a major problem given the high inactivity rates. A 
full labour market participation philosophy has yet not reached a certain share of nationals. 
3.2 Immigrants’ (and Nationals’) Incorporation: the case of social 
assistance 
Soysal (1994) as well as Bommes/Halfmann (1998) highlight the ambivalent “na-
tional” approach of welfare states; benefits were mainly aimed at nationals, but na-
tion-states became more and more subject to supra-national organisations which en-
tailed an increasing obligation to incorporate immigrants, at least those from other 
MS. „Migration‟ and „welfare systems in nation-states‟ constitute, a „contradictio in 
se‟: “to an increasing extent, rights and privileges once reserved for citizens of a na-
tion are codified and expanded as personal rights, undermining the national order of 
citizenship” (Soysal, 1994: 1).  
                                                       
18 Scandinavian countries produce efficiency (with high labour force participation) and equity (with middle class 
standards and egalitarian access) – best practice in terms of benchmarking. Continental countries produce equity 
(amongst the poor!) but no efficiency (due to high inactivity rates). And liberal models produce efficiency (low inac-
tivity rates) but no equity (extremely low benefits): Sapir, 2005. 
19 cf. JER and JRSPI as well as the bi-annual OECD Economic Surveys. 10 
 
Luxembourg‟s  means  tested  social  assistance,  the  Revenu  Minimum  Garanti 
(RMG) is a concrete example for a non-pro-active immigrant incorporation, for a 
prudent opening-up of non-contributory benefits. 
Incorporation of immigrants into the four main contributory Bismarckian insur-
ances (health, pension, accident and care insurances)  is automatic for those who 
have a work contract or are actively self-employed; members of the nuclear family 
are automatically co-insured. Here immigrants are incorporated in the same way as 
nationals, as soon as they award a work contract.  
However, the non-contributory benefits, mainly those, which are means tested 
and considered stigmatising, contain other conditions: a residence and an age condi-
tion in the case of Luxembourg. Both might concern nationals and / or immigrants. 
We will have a closer look into access conditions and how it developed. 
RMG as well as other benefits
20) contained and still contain a preliminary resi-
dence condition, which allows authorities to hinder newcomers which might be look-
ing for „social tourism‟. Users of social benefits and more so immigrants are often 
considered a „burden‟ to the state (Borjas and Hilton, 1996), lacking the necessary 
solidarity with the destination State (Bommes, 2007). Further, the EU legislation, 
which, in general, challenges the MS to open up their schemes to EU citizens, also 
protects its MS from non-active potential EU immigrants, those, who might become 
a “burden to the State” through having no work contract and/or insufficient financial 
resources (directives 364/1990 and 38/2004). However, the EU regulation on free 
movement 1612/68 (art. 7) also protects its active EU-migrants: “He shall enjoy the 
same social (and tax) advantages as national workers.” 
Regarding RMG, Guibentif and Bouget (1997) positively stress the inexistence 
of a nationality condition - in contrast to other MS - but characterise Luxembourg as 
the MS with the most rigorous residence condition: a previous official residence of 
10 years. The objective of authorities was to prevent “social tourism”– this was also 
the idea of the European directive 1990/364 aimed at non-active EU migrants
21. Lux-
embourg seemed to be in line with European legislation: immigrants, even EU immi-
grants should not “be a burden on the State”. The fear of abuse is explicit. The offi-
                                                       
20 “Allocation pour personnes gravement handicapées”, law of 1979 and “allocation de soins”, law of 1989. 
21 Free movement is guaranteed for active EU-citizens and their nuclear family; however for non-active EU citizens, 
Member states control for the entrance. 11 
 
cial idea was to treat all residents in the same way, whether nationals, EU or non-EU 
citizens. In 1989, the same condition was eased to “10 years at least during the last 
20 years”
22 in order to ease access for two groups: the homeless (without official res-
idence documents!) and nationals returning to Luxembourg after a stay abroad, who 
then had to wait another 10 years in order to become eligible. There was no concern 
about immigrants (draft bill 3249
00). Ten years later, in 1999 the residence condition 
was revised again. At this moment, there was a strong debate concerning EU and 
non-EU immigration. With regard to the residence condition, the opinions of the so-
cial partners highlighted on the one hand the danger of being sentenced by the Court 
of Justice of EU (CJEU) for non-opening-up, thus discriminating EU citizens and, on 
the other hand, the danger of discrimination of non-EU citizens (if EU-citizens would 
have immediate access) which could be sentenced by the European Court of Human 
Rights (Council of Europe). The Conseil d‟Etat (“second Chamber” of Luxembourg) 
proposed not to abandon too quickly the residence condition for EU-citizens, but to 
wait for a clear sentence by the CJEU.  
Different modifications of the draft bill have been introduced during the 3 years 
of debate.  Finally, the law of 29 April 1999 stipulated “5 years during the last 20 
years” for all, hence for EU- and non-EU citizens (as well as for nationals) in order 
to avoid “social tourism”, maintaining the philosophy to treat all resident claimants 
in the same way. According to the convention of Geneva (1951), a supranational le-
gal text and a decision by a national tribunal, Luxembourg had to accept immediate 
access to RMG for recognized refugees. The CJEU sentenced Luxembourg for indi-
rect discrimination of EU-citizens, as all EU citizens are entitled to “the same social 
(and tax) advantages as national workers” (art. 7 regulation 1612/68). Thereafter, na-
tional authorities had to abolish the residence condition for all EU-citizens, but main-
tained it for the non-Communitarians (2001). European MS enjoyed full sovereignty 
concerning non-EU immigrants up to 1997 (Treaty of Amsterdam), but even after 
1997, EU law does not yet indicate precise conditions for access to social security 
benefits for non-EU citizens with exception of the long term immigrants directive 
(Castles and Miller,2009: 181ss). In the case of Luxembourg, the opening-up of so-
cial rights has been imposed by supranational case law and legal texts.  With the pru-
                                                       
22  « y avoir résidé pendant dix ans au moins au cours des vingt dernières années; » (art.2 (1) of the law of 16 
June 1989). 12 
 
dent corporatist „incorporation‟, authorities intended to keep newcomers – mainly 
migrants - away from welfare provisions as long as there is no sentencing by supra-
national means (Soysal, 1994)
23: corporatist regimes protect those who are already 
member of the system and defend it against “intruders”.  
We will now analyse who contributes what to social security and the public 
budget in order to try to answer our aforementioned central question with regard of 
the sustainability of an outstanding because expanding corporatist-Scandinavian wel-
fare model. 
 
4  Contributions to social security and state’s budget / consump-
tions 
There is an abundant literature on the consumptions, less on the contributions of im-
migrants to the welfare protection system and the public budget of the destination 
country. Contributions to insurances as well as to taxes are automatic, linked to in-
come; consumptions of insurances are guaranteed in contrast to means tested bene-
fits. What about contributions to insurances and taxes and consumptions from insur-
ances and other allowances, both by nationals and by immigrants? With this empiri-
cal question we can first of all see which of our groups contributes more than it con-
sumes and the opposite. Secondly we come back to the aforementioned broader theo-
retical  framework,  highlighting  the  antagonism  between  national  welfare  regimes 
and migration, which within the political and academic debate led sometimes to a 
conclusion of an „abusing consumption‟ by migrants (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Soys-
al, 1994). 
Different authors study the impact of immigrants on the economy (wages, un-
employment, etc.). Immigrants are either shown to take-up welfare benefits more 
than nationals  (Borjas and Hilton, 1996), or their positive effects are highlighted for 
example, on ageing societies or on the wages  of the low skilled (Brücker et  al., 
2006).  For both results as well as for many others, there is an implicit statement of 
                                                       
23 Even if non-Communitarians have not to be considered according to EU legislation,  other supranational 
frameworks might consider this type of exclusion as discriminatory (e.g. the European Court of Human Rights). 
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homogeneity of immigrants as well as of nationals and the immigrants are predomi-
nantly those with a working class background. Others demonstrate little dependency 
on welfare for certain groups of immigrants (inner Scandinavian migration) as op-
posed to a higher dependency of other groups (migration from the South) (Pedersen, 
2005). Implicitly, inner Scandinavian immigrants are distinguished from the others 
from the South and are better off, whilst nationals are taken as a homogenous group. 
Still others explain different types of dependency on welfare schemes. For ex-
ample, the minimum income within different legal frameworks; this contrasts a liber-
al nation state with its liberal welfare regime (UK) and a conservative nation state 
with the equivalent welfare regime (Germany). This considers whether generous wel-
fare systems constitute a higher incentive for potential emigrants, whether these wel-
fare regimes are “welfare magnets” (Borjas, 1999; Hartmann-Hirsch, forthcoming); 
but no clear trend could be observed (Büchel and Frick, 2004).  
Moreover,  the  immigrants  in  the  UK  are  found  to  be  a  more  heterogeneous 
group than those in Germany and the latter perform worse than the former. This has 
been explained by the liberal welfare regime leaving more responsibility with the in-
dividual than with the State, whilst corporatist regimes are more likely to produce at-
titudes of “assistés”, relying on the State (Büchel and Frick, 2004). 
Finally, Pedersen (2005) observes that the very diverse results can be explained 
by the fact that the research had been done in different historical periods. It is based 
on  different  legal  frameworks  in  different  nation  states  and  on  different  benefit 
schemes with different types of immigrants.  
For nearly all researchers, there is an implicit statement on homogeneity of im-
migrants, more so for nationals, with immigrants predominantly being those with a 
working class background with some exceptions (Pedersen, 2005). 
In the following section, we will give an account of the data set and introduce 
our approach, following for the latter Büchel and Frick (2005), who compared the 
pre-government income (market) to the post-government income: starting with the 
pre-government /market income, adding-up public benefits and deducing contribu-
tions (taxes and insurances) in order to obtain the post-government income.  14 
 
This  approach  can  be  handled  in  the  most  appropriate  way  by  using  the 
PSELL3/EU-SILC household panel
24 (wave 2006). The survey provides detailed da-
ta on approximately 30 types of income
25. Furthermore, some  variables allow us to 
calculate personal taxes and social contribution as well as consumptions within a  
unique data base. We will concentrate on the resident population, as panel data ex-
clude cross border commuters. Our panel data includes residents, i.e. nationals, im-
migrants, and international civil servants. This sample allows us to analyse the eco-
nomic status and other socio-demographic characteristics of individuals and house-
holds. We built a dataset after matching adult individuals and households headed by 
a person aged between 25 and 64. Our observation unit is the individual and we ob-
tain almost 3500 individuals. For each individual, we got information about the age, 
the sex, the marital status, the nationality, and the year of immigration to Luxem-
bourg, the educational level, the activity, the market income etc. Although our analy-
sis  unit  is  an  individual,  we  use  some  questions  on  the  various  elements  of  the 
household‟s income (including the non-labour income and different public benefits 
aimed at the household or at certain persons of the household) as well as the taxes 
and the social security contribution. In Luxembourg public means tested benefits are 
always related to the household as a whole and not to an individual living in this 
household – a corporatist parameter. Excepted the income for each individual, we al-
so apply for individuals incomes related to the households according to  the OECD 
equivalence scale
26  on the household's income, which are added to the individual 
level. 
What is new about our approach is that we will differentiate immigrants as well 
as nationals with regard to educational levels. Hence, we can distinguish effects due 
to migration and education with a high probability of an equivalent effect on income 
and dependency on welfare. The educational level is considered a proxy of the pr o-
fessional status and the wage. Our analysis will be done with five target groups.  
Highly qualified non-EU immigrants enjoy easier access to the labour market than 
                                                       
24 Which included in 2002, 3.500 households and 10.000 individuals - 8.000 of them aged 16 and more. 
25 Wages, income from self-employment and from capital ( private income), pension schemes (they are generated by 
private and public funds (including State‟s contributions), different types of subsidiary incomes like unemployment 
benefit, social assistance, etc. Amongst public benefits, there are universal benefits, which can be cumulated with 
wages, and means tested benefits, which can only be matched in case of a private income which remains below a 
certain threshold. 
26 head of household=1; other adult members aged 15 years and older=0,5; children aged below 15=0,3. 15 
 
their less qualified counterparts given the aforementioned selective policy privileging 
those incoming migrants who have a wage of more than 4 times the minimum wage. 
Non-EU citizens award full free movement, thus face no obstacles. Hence we will 
have one unique group with 1. highly qualified non-EU and EU immigrants
27. For 
less
28 qualified immigrants, we distinguish clearly non-EU immigrants facing strong 
access conditions, and EU-citizens awarding free movement:  2. less qualified EU 
immigrants and 3. less qualified non-EU immigrants
29. If we differentiate immi-
grants in terms of qualification, we have to do the same for nationals with 4. highly 
and 5. less qualified nationals (table 1). The threshold for high qualification is hold-
ing a BA/ BSc according to OECD definitions 
   
                                                       
27 Splitting up this group would produce too small figures for statistical analysis with panel data. 
28 We are aware of the quite unprecise criterion,  but we followed OECD definitions. 
29 EU citizens are awarded free access to the labour market and, if they have a full residence permit, they are also 
entitled to minimal benefits like social assistance, etc. (via regulation 1612/68); this is not the case for non-EU citi-
zens. A different treatment of EU and non-EU citizens is in line with European legislation (cf. anti-discrimination 
directives 2000/43 and 2000/78). 16 
 
Table 2: Main source of income for individuals by the migration status and educational level of the head of household (percent), 2002-2006 
 
Nationality and educational level 
Primary income (Pre government income) 


















Highly qualified nationals 
25-44  87,5  28,7  44,2  1,5  0,0  2,9  1,0  50,1  0,5 
45-59  78,0  48,1  52,5  6,7  3,2  1,3  3,2  56,1  0,0 
60-75  19,7  59,6  52,8  72,0  1,0  0,5  15,5  22,8  3,1 
Highly qualified foreigners 
25-44  82,7  12,6  38,3  0,2  1,0  3,5  1,2  59,3  1,4 
45-59  82,0  23,0  37,2  1,3  1,2  2,9  1,2  67,2  0,2 
60-75  48,3  8,0  37,9  37,9  0,0  0,0  3,4  23,0  0,0 
Less qualified nationals 
25-44  77,1  18,6  34,5  1,9  2,5  13,7  1,3  65,8  3,9 
45-59  53,8  24,9  35,7  10,5  11,2  6,1  3,6  46,1  4,2 
60-75  4,9  33,1  40,8  87,5  6,8  0,8  1,5  12,8  2,8 
Less qualified EU foreigners 
25-44  79,1  7,3  20,5  1,4  2,7  15,0  3,8  81,1  7,0 
45-59  64,6  11,1  26,4  7,9  7,8  7,2  6,0  47,5  5,7 
60-75  7,3  15,0  31,4  78,5  11,7  1,0  3,4  8,1  4,2 
Less qualified non-EU foreigners 
25-44  51,5  3,1  16,5  0,5  3,1  20,1  4,6  78,9  19,6 
45-59  46,0  11,1  12,7  9,5  6,3  1,6  1,6  46,0  22,2 
60-75  0,0  13,5  8,1  43,2  5,4  8,1  0,0  59,5  43,2 
Source: PSELL3/EU-SILC, waves 2002-2006: households headed by persons aged 25 to 64, authors‟ calculations  




In the following section, we will comment on our findings concerning three items.  
For market income, we consider all types of non-public income. Under consumptions, 
we summarize income elements which are either entirely or partly financed by the state with, 
on the one hand, positively connoted universal benefits like child rearing benefits and, on the 
other hand, stigmatizing means tested benefits like social assistance. In Luxembourg, both 
are 100 percent financed by the State. Old age and disability pensions, which people are en-
titled to and have contributed to, will be included in the consumptions of public provisions. 
According to the income, contributions can be zero, low or high.  Thus we consider those 
who have pre-government incomes of more than 100 percent of the post-government income 
and contribute hence more than they consume being economically performing, independent 
of the State and positive elements for the sustainability of the welfare regime. Whilst those 
who consume more than they contribute and have a pre-government-income of less than 100 
percent depend on the State and are hence a potential ’burden to the State’. Furthermore, we 
distinguish age groups in order to respond to the missing „life-cycle data‟, which would be 
the optimum for the analysis of social security contributions and consumptions. 
4.1 Market income: even the less qualified immigrants contribute 
significantly 
Nationals report wages as a source of income to a lesser extent than immigrants – 
with the exception of non-EU citizens  and the highly qualified migrants aged 25 to 
44 (table 2). Regarding the latter in comparison with the equivalent nationals, longer 
educational periods might be the reason of the difference: De facto,  highly qualified 
immigrants have higher degrees, enter later the labour market, work longer than na-
tionals, obviously with „late exit patterns‟ (cf. Blossfeld et al., 2006). This corrobo-
rates with administrative data we mentioned in secton 2.1. Obviously immigrants 
demonstrate, to a much higher extent, a „universal solidarity attitude‟, even within 
the highest age group. Coming into a corporatist country as an economic immigrant 
with a Scandinavian or liberal educational background (childhood, youth) might ex-
plain the „late exit‟ pattern. Nationals are, on average, older than immigrants (Thill-
Ditsch, 2010); but even taking into account the age factor, we observe persistently 
the same „early exit‟ attitude for nationals. Nationals (both categories) report private 
incomes and self employment to a greater extent than their immigrant counterparts. 
However, self-employment is not necessarily correlated with high wages: it might 18 
 
entail employers of small craftwork companies, those who live on low and very low 
incomes like free lancers, as well as lawyers, doctors and employers with low or im-
portant incomes.  
Decomposing the pre-government income (table 3), the pre-government income 
of both skilled groups is similar and, logically, these two groups contribute more than 
the three others. For the less qualified, immigrants contribute more than nationals, 
demonstrating less „take-up attitudes‟, being then also less dependent on benefits. 
The only group, which remains below 100 percent for its pre-governmental income 
and are thus economically less performant, are the less qualified non-EU citizens; 
this is confirmed by other results (Ametepé and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008). With ex-
ception of the non-EU immigrants (3.8 percent of resident population: table 1) and 
all those aged 60 – 75 (nationals and immigrants), the other groups contribute more 




Table 3: Income component as proportion of total post-government income of individuals living in household headed by 25-75 years (percent), 2002-
2006 
 
Primary income (Pre 
government income) 



















Highly qualified nationals 
25-44  128,9  0,1  0,1  0,0  0,5  3,9  0,2  0,0  -25,9  100,0 
45-59  131,3  1,2  0,6  0,7  0,7  2,4  0,0  0,0  -26,8  100,0 
60-75  64,9  59,0  58,6  0,4  6,6  0,6  0,1  0,1  -23,9  100,0 
Highly qualified foreigners 
25-44  129,8  0,1  0,0  0,1  0,3  3,9  0,1  0,0  -26,3  100,0 
45-59  121,1  0,6  0,1  0,5  0,3  3,9  0,0  0,0  -21,2  100,0 
60-75  92,5  32,5  32,5  0,0  1,6  1,5  0,0  0,0  -22,2  100,0 
Less qualified nationals 
25-44  117,6  1,4  0,9  0,5  0,5  7,2  0,7  0,3  -22,8  100,0 
45-59  110,9  11,0  5,3  5,7  3,0  3,4  0,9  0,6  -23,3  100,0 
60-75  26,7  93,1  88,9  4,2  0,9  0,4  0,5  0,5  -17,8  100,0 
 Less qualified EU forei-
gners 
25-44  111,1  1,1  0,3  0,7  1,3  10,4  1,2  0,5  -21,8  100,0 
45-59  114,5  7,8  3,6  4,2  4,0  4,5  2,2  1,9  -25,7  100,0 
60-75  18,2  95,7  86,7  9,0  2,9  0,5  1,5  1,5  -15,8  100,0 
Less qualified non-EU fo-
reigners 
25-44  88,4  0,3  0,0  0,3  2,1  22,0  4,7  2,8  -18,3  100,0 
45-59  71,1  31,3  15,3  16,0  0,5  4,8  17,2  17,0  -20,7  100,0 
60-75  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  100,0 
All households  99,4  21,7  19,0  2,7  1,6  4,5  0,8  0,6  22,6  100,0 
Source: PSELL3/EU-SILC, waves 2002-2006: households headed by persons aged 25 to 64, authors‟ calculations  
*As proportion of pre-government income + pension + early retirement + unemployment+RMG+public benefits 




4.2 Consumptions vary according to the type of benefits 
The high share of highly and less qualified nationals reporting that they have an old 
age pension is complementary to their aforementioned lower labour market participa-
tion, mainly for those aged 60 to 75; the difference between immigrants and nation-
als is significant. One can also relate these findings to lower educational achieve-
ments and the aforementioned „early exit‟ corporatist attitudes (Blossfeld, 2006; table 
2).  
Disability schemes do not really concern highly qualified nationals and immi-
grants. According to administrative data, those working in the most dangerous eco-
nomic sectors (like construction) are the poorly qualified newcomers (mainly immi-
grants), as well as the elderly workers (mainly nationals). Less qualified nationals 
and EU-immigrants use this benefit more than both highly qualified groups; there is 
clearly an earlier exit strategy by nationals with an important tape-up for the 45 – 59 
years old. Interestingly enough, the share of disability users is lowest for the less 
qualified non-EU immigrants, even if they are overrepresented within those danger-
ous sectors. This might be due to problems of legal obstacles and/or information 
access for non-EU immigrants, of high costs of take-up just as for social assistance 
(table 2;  Castranova, 2001; Ametepé and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008) and, finally the 
fear of being returned to the country of origin (Bolzman, 2007). Less qualified na-
tionals use this scheme most. 
For early retirement and unemployment
1, highly qualified nationals aged 60 – 75 
are the most important group of users, even if within our PSELL3/EU-SILC sample 
16 percent of nationals and 4 percent of immigrants are civil servants, thus protected 
against unemployment and are not eligible for early retirement. Within the less quali-
fied, the poorly performing non-EU citizens use these benefits rarely – facing legal 
obstacles (as long as they have limited work permits
2) and being, on average, the 
youngest group. Concerning the three less qualified groups, nationals use these 
                                                       
1 We follow the approach of Büchel and Frick and in the same time we respond to the concept of broad unemployment 
(all types of passive schemes like early retirement, unemployment, social assistance and disability: OECD). Due to 
low frequencies, we considered both in one category. We did not include disability as this is, in legal terms, part of the 
pension scheme, neither social assistance as this is the regime meeting the most numerous negative connotations and 
as we have published a more indepth paper on this item (Amétépé and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2009)..   
2 As soon as the work permit expires, the unemployment benefits are not any more due, thus, benefit periods might be 
considerably shortened; we refer to legal disposals of the data. 21 
 
schemes to a much higher extent – again we can refer to corporatist attitudes and 
educational  achievements.  However,  even  if  highly  skilled  nationals  are  awarded 
these benefits (early retirement and unemployment benefit) less often, the share of 
these benefits within their income is higher than that of the equivalent group of im-
migrants (table 3).  
For child rearing benefits (child benefit plus others), the figures reflect the de-
mographic situation in Luxembourg: the fertility of immigrants is higher than that of 
nationals for nearly all age groups and educational levels. Hence, they use these ben-
efits  more
3 (table 2). Taking the share of these benefits with regard to the post -
government income, one recognizes logically the increasing impact of child benefits 
on lower and low pos t-government incomes for migrants and mainly for the less 
qualified non-EU migrants with low incomes (table 3). We do consider the use of 
child rearing benefits as a positive input, given the effects for future sustainability of 
welfare schemes.  
For “other public transfers” (cash benefit of health and care insurances, students‟ 
loans), again we observe the similarity for the two highly skilled groups, this time al-
so for the less qualified nationals and EU-immigrants, but a high dependence on 
these benefits for the less qualified non-EU immigrants (tables 2 and 3).  
Concerning social assistance, the non-EU less qualified immigrants are those 
with the highest poverty risk. According to Ametepé and Hartmann-Hirsch (2010), 
this group has a very high eligibility rate, however only half of the eligible persons 
go for take-up, whilst the other less qualified groups have a much lower eligibility 
and similar take-up, which might again be due to the fear of being returned. Highly 
qualified nationals or immigrants have nearly no eligibility and hence no take-up. 
Furthermore, the 16 (4) percent of national (international) civil servants in the sample 
explain lower take-up rates of less qualified nationals.  
Within the table of decomposition (table 3), these results are complementary to 
those of the previous section on market income.  
                                                       
3 Children born by foreign women are more numerous (absolute figures) than those born by nationals (STA-
TEC: annuaire statistique). 
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Taxes and Social security contributions are a logical consequence of gross wag-
es/incomes as detailed in work contracts/self employment following the addition of 
private income (pre-government) and once family composition has been taken into 
account. Comparing pre- and post-government income, non-EU less qualified immi-
grants consume more than they contribute, being the only “winners” of the system 
(Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Ametepé and Hartmann-Hirsch, 2008); this concerns only 
3.8 percent of the population (table 1). For the other four groups they contribute 
more than they consume. The labour market participation of immigrants is signifi-
cantly higher and consequently their dependence on replacement incomes is lower – 
always with the exception of the small group of less qualified non-EU immigrants.  
With regard to the less qualified EU immigrants, the biggest group of Portuguese 
workers did experience Mediterranean welfare systems, where take-up of benefits 
was hampered in former decades due to missing benefits. Thus, even with an overall 
Bismarckian corporatist structure, these immigrants could not rely in the same way 
on cash benefits as this was the case in Northern European corporatist systems. Their 
attitudes might thus be more similar to liberal and Scandinavian patterns (Langers, 
2007). 
Büchel and Frick (2005) observed better performing immigrants in Luxembourg 
as compared to Germany. Meanwhile, we can be more precise: only the less qualified 
non-EU immigrants perform poorly, whilst the other two groups of immigrants per-
form better than nationals. Hence, the vast majority, contribute more than they con-
sume in contrast to some traditional research findings (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Bor-
jas, 1999). Migrants compensate the early exit behavior and the take-up orientated at-
titudes of nationals. They are positive elements for the sustainability and more so for 
the enlarging evolution of this welfare regime. 
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5  Conclusion 
Luxembourg‟s  corporatist  and  universalistic-Scandinavian  welfare  system  can  be 
considered as one of, if not the most substantial model in EU. Other MS have been 
obliged to cut back their provisions in order to sustain their systems. Luxembourg 
however has up till now never been obliged to launch retrenchment policies and nev-
er opted for liberalization. It is the only corporatist system which has been expanded. 
How was it possible that this small nation-state has never been forced to launch re-
trenchment policies? And what is the role of immigrants within this exceptional situ-
ation?  
Luxembourg  has  a  predominantly  economic  immigration  with  an  important 
share of highly qualified immigrants and of foreign economic leaders as well as a 
well performing less qualified EU immigration. Foreigners (immigrants and cross 
border  commuters)  have  an  important  quantitative  and  qualitative  impact  on  the 
competitive sector and can be considered as the main producers of Luxembourg‟s 
wealth. The high tax income as well as the sustaining membership of the younger 
immigrants and cross border commuters allowed authorities to enlarge and improve 
the corporatist welfare regime. The input of crossers is even higher than that of im-
migrants: nearly 100 percent are active; and according to EU law they contribute ful-
ly, but are not entitled to benefit fully to provisions as some benefits conditioned by 
residence
4. Thus for the care insurance, 44 percent of contributors are those from 
cross border commuters and only 1.4 percent of spendings are exported (Hartmann -
Hirsch, forthcoming).  
Welfare regimes have been developed mainly with regard to nationals. The resi-
dence condition for social assistance can be considered as an indirectly excluding 
„corporatist incorporation‟ policy, protecting those who are in the system, initially 
nationals, against potential newcomers, mainly immigrants, who might be a „danger‟ 
for the sustainability of the system. Luxembourg like other MS has been obliged to 
open-up its means tested benefits for refugees and for EU-citizens – national incor-
poration policies had to adapt to supra-national law case and legislation. Incorpora-
tion policies were prudent and too prudent, if one considers the highly performing 
                                                       
4This is the case for benefits in kind of the care insurance. 24 
 
and  predominantly  economic  immigration  in  Luxembourg,  which  sustains  insur-
ances, other tax financed benefits and more so the expansion of the welfare system; 
overall, immigrants contribute more than they consume.  The exclusive incorporation 
policies tackled an inexistent danger of „abuse‟ by the well performing highly quali-
fied immigrants and the quantitatively important group of less qualified EU citizens. 
Prudence might be explained with regard to the only fragile, small group of less qual-
ified non-EU citizens. However, obstacles for the access to the labour market might 
also explain their weak economic performance (Büchel and Frick, 2004).  
The fear of „social tourism‟, the underlying reason for the residence condition, 
might be explained by the specific geographical situation of this small nation-State 
located in-between MS with corporatist and non-Scandinavian models, which un-
derwent liberalization policies. However, we observe an overall higher labour market 
participation by immigrants as compared to nationals with exception of the less qual-
ified non-EU immigrants. The overwhelming majority of immigrants demonstrate 
more liberal or Scandinavian attitudes than the more „corporatist‟ nationals. We ob-
serve an important similarity in the two highly qualified groups of nationals and im-
migrants.  All  immigrants  are  stronger  users  of  child  benefits  than  nationals;  this 
might be considered as „a burden‟ to the welfare regime, but is also a response to the 
generation-contract for the welfare regimes.  
Let us come back to the aforementioned paradox of an expanding corporatist-
universalistic model with highest standards. We highlighted the high equity, but a 
missing solidarity with the welfare state, thus a low efficiency (Sapir, 2005 and Pier-
son, 2001). Obviously, foreigners, immigrants and even more so cross border com-
muters (Hartmann-Hirsch, forthcoming), compensate the low labour participation of 
nationals, thus they demonstrate a high „solidarity‟ with the destination country (Esp-
ing-Andersen). The steady increase of young  foreign contributors provided Luxem-
bourg with the means to develop from a corporatist model to a Scandinavian with 
highest provisions, an emerging service sector and no significant retrenchment poli-
cy. Foreigners guarantee the current efficiency of the welfare regime. However, the 
OECD (2008) as well as the European Commission highlight the danger for future 
sustainability,  mainly  of  the  pension  insurance.  Luxembourg  will  face  expensive 
years for these insurances as the current younger group of immigrants and crossers 25 
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